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ANNA M. CIENCIALA 
DETECTIVE WORK: RESEARCHING SOVIET 
WORLD WAR II POLICY ON POLAND
IN RUSSIAN ARCHIVES (Moscow, 1994)*
SOVIET POLICY ON POLAND during the Second World War has been, with a few
exceptions, generally marginalized in English language studies of wartime
diplomacy. This seems strange, for the borders and political system of postwar
Poland were among Stalin’s major concerns. Indeed, Soviet control of Poland
would ensure Soviet control of Central and Eastern Europe as well as a land bridge
to Germany. As it happened, Stalin’s demands regarding Poland were a thorny
issue in Anglo-Soviet relations, and sometimes a delicate one in U.S.- Soviet
relations. Polish language studies on the policies of the Polish government-in-exile,
its relations with Moscow, and on Polish communists, as well as specialized
English language works on these subjects — including mine — were based on
available Polish, British, and American sources but suffered from the lack of
Russian archival material. This, of course, allowed — and still allows — for
different interpretations of Soviet policy towards Poland, and of Soviet wartime
policy in general.1
1. English language studies that give some coverage to the Polish question include: Martin
Kitchen, British policy towards the Soviet Union during the Second World War (New York,
1986); Steven M. Miner, Between Churchill and Stalin. The Soviet Union and the origins of the
grand alliance (Chapel Hill — London, 1988). Of those that deal specifically with Poland, the
most important are: Detlef Brandes, Grossbritanien und seine osteuropäischen Allierten, 1939-
1943 (Munich, 1988) (the sections on Poland are based on British and Polish archival sources);
John Coutovidis, Jaime Reynolds, Poland 1939-1947 (Leicester — New York, 1986) (based
mainly on British archival documents); George Kacewicz, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and
the Polish government in exile 1939-1945 (The Hague, 1979) (based mostly on published
sources); Jan Karski, The Great Powers and Poland 1919-1945. From Versailles to Yalta
(Lanham — New York — London, 1985) (based mostly on published sources); Richard C.
Lukas, The strange allies. The United States and Poland 1941-1945 (Knoxville, TN, 1978)
(based on U.S. and Polish archival sources); Anita J. Pra§mowska, Britain and Poland 1939-
* This is a revised version of the paper I read at the seminar on “Assessing the new Soviet
archival sources,” Yale University, New Haven, CT, May 17, 1997.
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Some years ago, I completed research on the topic: “Poland in British, U.S. and
Soviet policies in World War II,” at the British Public Record Office, in the
National Archives, Washington, DC, and the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde
Park, NY, also in Polish government collections located at the Hoover Archives,
Stanford, CA, and at the Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum, London. In
Warsaw, I had read the press and radio materials of the Polska Partia Robotnicza
(PPR, Polish Workers’ Party), as well as some files of the Zwiàzek Patriotów
Polskich w ZSSR (ZPP, Union of Polish Patriots in the USSR). These carefully
selected files were the only archival sources accessible to non-party historians
before 1989. In 1993, I read PPR documents, formerly in the closed Central
Committee Archives, transferred after the fall of communism to the Archiwum Akt
Nowych (AAN, Polish State Archives on Modern History), Warsaw. My articles on
Polish-Soviet relations and the Polish question in World War II were, with one
exception, based on archival documents available in the West, plus published
sources.2 These articles were to serve as chapters for my book on Poland in British,
U.S. and Soviet policy in World War II, due for completion in 1989-1990.
However, on the collapse of communism, I decided to wait until I could read
Russian archival documents. Finally, in summer 1994, with the aid of a short term
IREX grant, I was able to undertake research in Moscow. 
Before discussing my research in Moscow archives, I will give a brief outline of
what was, until recently, already known about Soviet policy on Poland in World
War II but is not generally known today except to specialists on the subject. Next, I
will enumerate documents published since 1992 — when some important Russian
documents were published — giving examples mainly from the period 1939-1941,
2.  See: Anna M. Cienciala, “The question of the Polish-Soviet frontier in 1939-1940,” Polish
Review, 33, 3 (New York, 1988): 295-324; Id., “The diplomatic background of the Warsaw
Rising of 1944: The players and the stakes,” ibid., 39, 4 (1994): 393-413; Id., “Great Britain and
Poland before and after Yalta, 1943-1945,” ibid., 40, 3 (1995): 281-314; Id., “General Sikorski
and the conclusion of the Polish-Soviet agreement of July 30, 1941: A reassessment,” ibid.,
 
 41,
4 (1996): 401-434; Id., “New light on Oskar Lange as an intermediary between Roosevelt and
Stalin in attempts to create a new Polish government (January-November 1944),” 
 
Acta
Poloniae Historica,
 
 73 (Warsaw, 1996): 89-134 (based mainly on O. Lange papers in the
Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow).
1943. The betrayed ally (Cambridge, 1995) (based on British and Polish archival sources but
flawed by the author’s unremitting condemnation of the Polish government-in-exile); Sarah
Meiklejohn Terry, Poland’s place in Europe. General Sikorski and the origin of the Oder-
Neisse line, 1939-1943 (Princeton, NJ, 1983) (based on British and Polish archival sources).
For a study of the Polish communists in the period 1943-1948, see: Krystyna Kersten, The
establishment of communist rule in Poland, 1943-1948 (Berkeley, CA, 1991) (based mainly on
PPR archival sources). Polish language studies on Polish-Soviet relations in World War II have
thus far been based mostly on Polish archival sources, see: Jacek S@lusarczyk, Stosunki polsko-
sowieckie 1939-1945 (Warsaw, 1993) and Eugeniusz Duraczyn@ski, “Polska w polityce
Moskwy,” in Micha∏ Pu∏aski et al., eds, Z dziejo@w Europy Ârodkowej w XX Wieku. Studia
ofiarowane Henrykowi Batowskiemu w 90 rocznic´ urodzin (Krako@w, 1997): 171-184. The
one Russian language monograph on Polish-Soviet wartime relations: Valentina S.
Parsadanova, Sovetsko-pol’skie otnosheniia v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny (Moscow,
1982) is based on then available sources and reflects the official Soviet view at the time.
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on which I have read conference papers.
 
3
 
 The rest of the paper will deal with my
experience of working in three Moscow archives, i.e. with what I found and what is
still missing. Throughout the paper, published sources will be mentioned where
appropriate, along with key questions that remain to be answered.
It is, of course, true that for a long time before 1992 much of the documentary
evidence indicated that Stalin’s goal was a communist, Soviet-dominated Poland.
 
4
 
It was not only the largest and most populous country in Eastern Europe, but also
the natural land bridge for Soviet access to Germany. Indeed, in 1920 Lenin had
seen it as a Soviet bridgehead to give support to expected revolutions in Germany
and Italy, and he envisaged it as a Soviet republic. It is most likely that Stalin shared
these views. However, the Polish army led by Jo@
 
zef Pi
 
∏
 
sudski, defeated the Red
Army at the gates of Warsaw and the Treaty of Riga of March 1921 established the
Polish-Soviet frontier which left western Belorussia and western Ukraine in
Poland.
 
5
 
 (N.B. East Galicia, i.e. western Ukraine, had never belonged to the
Russian Empire. The Ukrainians and Belorussians of eastern Poland outnumbered
the Poles, but the latter made up about 33% of the whole population estimated at
14,420,000 in 1939). It also seems that Stalin, who was Political Commissar in
Semen A. Budennyi’s Cavalry Army in East Galicia, nursed vengeful memories of
the Soviet defeat. Whatever the case may be, a question put by the Narodnyi
Komitet Vnutrennikh Del (NKVD, National Committee of Internal Affairs) to all
Polish officers taken prisoner in the Soviet invasion of eastern Poland in the fall of
1939 was whether they had fought in the Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1920. 
 
3. See: Anna M. Cienciala, “Stalin and the Polish communists in World War II: A
reassessment,” paper read at the national convention of the American Association for the
Advancement of Slavic Studies (AAASS), Philadelphia, November 19, 1994, and revised
version of same: “Stalin’s changing plans for Poland, 1940-1941,” paper read at a joint meeting
of The Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies and the Woodrow Wilson Center for
East European Studies, Washington, DC, March 23, 1995.
4. For documentary collections published before 1992, see: Stanislaw Biega
 
ƒ
 
ski et al, eds,
 
Documents on Polish-Soviet relations 1939-1945
 
, 2 vols (London, 1961, 1967) (based on
Polish government archives in the Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum, London); Euzebiusz
Basi
 
ƒ
 
ski 
 
et al
 
, eds, 
 
Dokumenty i materia
 
∏
 
y do historii stosunko
 
@
 
w Polsko-Radzieckich,
 
 VI-
VIII (Warsaw, 1973, 1974) (based on published and archival sources; Russian documents are in
Russian. There is a parallel Russian edition); Antony Polonsky, ed., 
 
The Great Powers and the
Polish question 1941-1945. A documentary study in Cold War origins
 
 (London, 1976) (based
on Polish and British archival sources); Antony Polonsky, Boles
 
∏
 
aw Drukier, eds, 
 
The
beginnings of communist rule in Poland. December 1943-June 1945 
 
(London, 1980) (based on
Polish Central Committee documents which Drukier, a former member of that body and then
 
rektor
 
 of the party school, Warsaw, smuggled out of Poland).
5. Lenin gave the following reasons for the Bolshevik rejection of the Curzon Line proposal in
July 1920: the Entente was already beaten so the Bolshevik leadership decided to go over to the
offensive; it expected revolutions in Germany and Italy; the destruction of Poland would mean
the destruction of the “Versailles system;” they wanted to “feel out with bayonets” whether
Poland would go Soviet. For Lenin’s speech at a closed session of the IX Party Congress,
September 22, 1920, see: 
 
Istoricheskii arkhiv,
 
 1 (1992): 14-29, partly quoted in Richard Pipes,
 
Russia under the Bolshevik regime
 
 (New York, 1993): 177-183. On the military history of the
war, see: Norman Davies, 
 
White eagle, red star. The Polish-Soviet war, 1919-1920
 
 (London,
1972 and reprints); on diplomatic history, see: Piotr W. Wandycz, 
 
Soviet-Polish relations,
1917-1921 
 
(Cambridge, MA, 1969); on Pi
 
∏
 
sudski’s federal plans, see: Marian K.
Dziewanowski, 
 
Joseph Pilsudski: A European federalist, 1918-1922 
 
(Stanford, CA, 1969).
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The Red Army entered eastern Poland on September 17, 1939, pursuant to the
secret protocol in the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of August 23, 1939. It is
known that Stalin opposed the idea of a rump Polish state, and the region was annexed
to the USSR. This annexation was “legalized” by rigged elections to west
Belorussian and west Ukrainian Soviets in October 1939, after which these Soviets
succesfully petitioned the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for union with the Soviet
Belorussian and Ukrainian republics. At the same time, there were mass arrests and
killings of former Polish officials and many educated Poles. Later, in 1940-1941,
about 1,080,000 or 8% of the entire population, were forcibly deported to the USSR.
Just over half of this number were ethnic Poles — followed by Ukrainians, Jews, and
Belorussians. An estimated 150,000 Poles survived.
 
6
 
 After a brief interlude of
relatively friendly Polish-Soviet relations which began with the Sikorski-Maiskii
Pact in late July 1941, Stalin broke off relations in late April 1943. The pretext for this
step was the Polish government’s request for an International Red Cross
investigation of the Katyn massacre of Polish officers, discovered and publicized by
the Germans on April 13 that year. (Those buried at Katyn made up about one third of
the total officers reported by the Polish government as missing). In 1944-1945, as
Soviet troops advanced through Poland, Stalin destroyed the Polish underground
movement, which recognized the Polish government in London, and replaced its
leaders with his own communist Poles. Alongside them, Stalin allowed a few
symbolic democrats headed by the former premier of the government-in-exile, also
leader of the Polish Peasant Party, Stanis
 
∏
 
aw Miko
 
∏
 
ajczyk. This was not only
Stalin’s concession to his western allies, but also a bid for the support of the largest
Polish political party, much needed by the Polish communists for the time being. 
Several collections of Russian documents regarding Poland were published in and
after 1992, most of which appeared by summer 1994. Here it should be noted that the
Soviet “cover-up” of the 1940 massacres of Polish officers in the USSR lasted until
April 13, 1990, when Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev handed to then Polish
President Wojciech Jaruzelski a list of the names of Polish military, police, and others
murdered by the NKVD in spring 1940. In October 1992, Russian President Boris N.
El’tsin ordered that copies of key documents be given to Polish President Lech
Wa
 
∏
 
´
 
sa. This led to publications in Poland, of which the most important were several
small bilingual Russian-Polish volumes dealing with the Katyn massacre of Polish
officers, and various aspects of Polish-Soviet relations.
 
7
 
 It is no exaggeration to say
 
6. See estimates by Dr. Marek Tuszy
 
ƒ
 
ski, “Soviet war crimes against Poland during the Second
World War,”
 
 Polish Review
 
, 44, 2 (1999): 183-216.
7. See: Wojciech Materski, ed., 
 
Katy
 
ƒ
 
. Dokumenty ludobo
 
@
 
jstwa. Dokumenty i materia
 
∏
 
y
archiwalne przekazane Polsce 14 pa
 
ê
 
dziernika 1992 r
 
. (Warsaw: Instytut Studio
 
@
 
w Politycznych
Polskiej Akademii Nauk [ISPPAN], 1992); English translation with preface by Janusz K.
Zawodny: 
 
Katyn. Documents of genocide
 
 (Warsaw, 1993). (N.B. Zawodny authored the best
documented English language study of Katyn before Russian documents were accessible:
 
Death in the forest
 
 (Notre Dame, IN, 1962 and reprints). See also the five small volumes in the
series:
 
 Z archiwo
 
@
 
w sowieckich, 
 
edited by W. Materski, dealing with: Polish prisoners of war in
the USSR, 1939-1941; the Polish army in the USSR, 1941-1942; Polish-Soviet conflicts 1941-
1944; Stalin and the Warsaw rising, 1944; and the return of Home Army
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that, together with a volume of documents on NKVD action against the wartime
Polish underground in 1944-1945, another with NKVD documents on the arrest and
rigged trial of Polish underground leaders in Moscow in June 1944, and a volume of
documents on Polish-Soviet relations in the years 1944-1949,
 
8
 
 
 
these publications
constituted important evidence on Soviet policy towards Poland during World War
II, that is, on this policy as expressed in action. There are also relevant documents in a
documentary collection on Soviet security organizations’ activity in World War II,
and in a volume of documents on the history of the Polish-Soviet military alliance,
1941-1945.
 
9
 
 
 
Furthermore,
 
 
 
pursuant to an agreement concluded in April 1992,
 
 
 
the
directors of the Russian and Polish State Archives signed a protocol in February 1993
to publish parallel volumes of documents on the imprisonment and massacre of
Polish officers in the USSR, also on the Soviet cover-up. In the meanwhile, Polish
and Russian historians discovered many more relevant documents in Russian
archives. As a result of all this work, the first Polish volume was published in 1995,
the second in June 1998, and one Russian volume appeared in Moscow in spring
1997.
 
10
 
 Finally, Yale University Press appointed the author of this paper as the
American editor of a volume on the Katyn and other massacres of Polish officers, also
on the cover-up, in its series 
 
The annals of communism. 
 
Nataliia S. Lebedeva, the pre-
eminent Russian authority on the Katyn massacre
 
 
 
is the Russian co-editor,
 
11
 
 and
 
8. Albin F. Noskova 
 
et al.
 
, eds, 
 
NKVD i pol’skoe podpol’e 1944-1945 gg. (po “osobym
papkam” I.V. Stalina
 
) (Moscow: Institut slavianovedeniia i balkanistiki RAN, 1994). Andrzej
Chmielarz, Andrzej Krzysztof Kunert, eds, 
 
Proces szesnastu. Dokumenty NKWD
 
 (Warsaw,
1995) (Polish translations of materials supplied by the Russian Military Prosecutor General’s
office). See also: Gennadij A. Bordiugiew, Aleksander Kocha
 
ƒ
 
ski, Adam Koseski, Gennadij F.
Matwiejew, Andrzej Paczkowski, eds, (Polish transliteration of Russian names), 
 
Polska-ZSRR.
Struktury podleglosci. Dokumenty KC WKP(b) 1944-1949 
 
(Warsaw, 1995); Russian edition
with same editors: 
 
SSSR-Pol’sha: mekhanizmy podchineniia 1944-1949
 
 
 
gg
 
. 
 
Sbornik
dokumentov
 
 (Moscow: AIRO-XX, 1995).
9. 
 
Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine. Sbornik
dokumentov, 
 
vol. 1 (Moscow: Kniga i Biznes, 1995). See also: Andrzej Chmielarz, Wojciech
Materski, Andrzej Paczkowski, eds, 
 
NKWD o Polsce i Polakach. Rekonesans archiwalny
 
(Warsaw: ISPPAN, 1996) and. V.A. Zolotorev 
 
et al.
 
, eds, 
 
SSSR i Pol’sha. 1941-1945. K istorii
voennogo soiuza. Dokumenty i materialy
 
, vol. 14. 3 (1) in the series 
 
Russkii arkhiv. Velikaia
Otechestvennaia
 
 (Moscow: Terra, 1994). The editors state erroneously that general W. Anders
served in the German army in 1918, and that he was a “descendant of Baltic barons,” (p. 13,
note 3). The volume lacks documents on the raising of the second Polish army in the USSR
under general Zygmunt Berling in 1943-1944. 
10. 
 
Katy
 
ƒ
 
. Dokumenty zbrodni. 
 
Tom 1.
 
 Je
 
ƒ
 
cy niewypowiedzianej wojny: sierpie
 
ƒ
 
 1939-marzec
1940 
 
(Warsaw, 1995); responsible editors: Wojciech Materski and Boles
 
∏
 
aw Woszczy
 
ƒ
 
ski
assisted by historian Ewa Rossowska, with Prof. Nataliia Lebedeva and archivist Nelli A. Petrosova
as the responsible Russian editors. The first Russian volume appeared in spring 1997 titled: 
 
Katyn’.
Plenniki neob”iavlennoi voiny
 
 (Moscow: “Demokratiia,” 1997)
 
, 
 
with
 
 
 
N. Lebedeva listed as the
responsible Russian editor; W. Materski was the responsible Polish editor though not designated as
such. This work was published in the series: “Rossiia. XX Vek” with a preface by Aleksandr
Iakovlev, head of the Democracy Fund which provided a subsidy for its publication.
11. See Nataliia S. Lebedeva, 
 
Katyn’. Prestuplenie protiv chelovechestva
 
 (Moscow, 1994), Id.,
“Chetvertyi razdel Pol’shi i katynskaia tragediia,” in: Iu. N. Afanas’ev, ed., 
 
Drugaia voina:
1939-1945 
 
(Moscow, 1995).
soldiers from the USSR. All these documents, received from the Russian government, were
published with parallel Russian and Polish texts by ISPPAN (Warsaw, 1992-1995).
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Professor Wojciech Materski — who edited previous collections of Russian
documents — is the Polish co-editor. The volume is due to appear in 2000. 
Given this historical background and the published documents, my research
goal in Moscow was to find Russian documents illustrating Stalin’s concepts of
postwar Poland at different periods of the war. Regarding the immediate prewar
and early-war period, studies published a long time before 1992 indicated that
Stalin considered organizing a new Polish communist party in 1939 to replace the
one he had dissolved in 1938, whose leaders he killed in the purges of the years
1936-1938. Thus, a group of hand-picked, Polish communists called the “Paris
initiative group” was organized in Paris in January 1939. They published three
issues of a periodical titled 
 
Information Bulletin, 
 
which was smuggled into Poland.
The first issue called for a “united front” of all Polish parties to create a government
of national unity. However, the third and last issue, published in April — i.e. just
after the announcement of the British Guarantee of Polish independence of March
31 — called for the overthrow of the existing Polish government. Here, two
questions arise: What did Stalin have in mind when he allowed the Paris group to
come into being and publish its 
 
Bulletin
 
? Did the writers of the 
 
Bulletin
 
 go beyond
a brief sanctioned by Moscow, or did Stalin end the short-lived publication because
he no longer needed it? Whatever the case may be, he shelved these Polish
communists sometime in the spring of 1939, and this might have been connected
with the revival of Soviet-German talks on an economic agreement. (The group
remained in Paris until the fall of France in mid-June 1940, after which they
travelled to the USSR). Despite the 
 
Bulletin’s
 
 demise, the Ispolnitel’nyi Komitet
Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala (IKKI, Executive Committee of the
Comintern) resolved on May 16, 1939 to reactivate the Polish Communist Party.
Ten days later, IKKI established a new “initiative group” on Polish affairs attached
to the Comintern. It was to be led by three Polish communists then in the Paris
initiative group, headed by one of the heroes of the Spanish Civil War, Boles
 
∏
 
aw
Mo
 
∏
 
ojec.
 
12
 
 However, no steps were taken to reactivate a Polish Communist Party
until April 1941. The question is: Why was this matter allowed to lapse for so long?
Perhaps this was so because Stalin decided to pursue not just an economic but also a
political agreement with Hitler, and having achieved it, did not see any need to
create a new Polish communist party ? 
As regards Soviet policy towards Poland between 1939 and 1941, Russian
documents handed over to the Polish government in October 1992, as well as others
published later, confirm what many Poles had believed for decades. They show that
Stalin intended to destroy the leading civilian and military cadres of the Polish
state — which was also the policy of Nazi Germany. On September 19, 1939,
 
12. See notes by Jakub Berman, cit. in Marian Malinowski, 
 
Geneza PPR, 
 
2d rev. ed. (Warsaw,
1975): 41-43; see also: N. S. Lebedeva, “The Comintern and Poland in 1939-1943,”
 
International Affairs
 
, 8 (Moscow, 1993). For an English language history of the Polish
communists, see: B. de Weydenthal, 
 
The communists of Poland. An historical outline,
 
 2 rev.
ed. (Stanford, CA, 1986). Berman, a prewar communist, was an instructor at the Comintern
party school, also a member of the Polish communist leadership in the USSR and later in
postwar Poland until October 1956.
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pursuant to a decision of the Politbiuro, the Commissar of National Defense,
marshal Kliment E.Voroshilov, issued a directive that the Red Army hand over
Polish officers taken prisoner in the previous month to the NKVD. Soon thereafter,
these officers were relocated to three camps: Starobelsk, in Ukraine, also Kozelsk
and Ostashkov in western Russia. (The last camp held police, border guards, and
various civilians). In late 1939, NKVD officers started interrogating the prisoners.
(As mentioned earlier, one of the questions asked of each prisoner was whether he
had fought in the Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1920). Finally, on March 5, 1940, the
Politbiuro approved a resolution proposed by Lavrentii P. Beriia, Commissar of the
NKVD stating that the 14,700 officers and other prisoners in the three camps, as
well as the 11,000 held in NKVD prisons in western Belorussia and western
Ukraine, were unregenerate enemies of the Soviet Union and should be executed
without trial.13 The vast majority were executed, but 432 were spared from the
camps, to be joined in summer 1940 by officers who had been interned in
Lithuania. 
It should be noted that apart from its administrative control over these prisoners,
the NKVD was also involved in hunting down specific categories of Poles. In
accordance with Beriia’s directive issued on September 15, 1939 — two days
before the Soviet entry into eastern Poland — the NKVD arrested members of
Polish military intelligence, police, administration, and political leaders.
Furthermore, as noted earlier, in 1940-1941, about 1,080,000, or 8% of the
population, qualified as “undesirable,” were deported into the Soviet interior,
mostly to labor camps. It is also known that a large number of former Polish
communists, who had sought refuge from the Germans under Soviet rule, were
arrested and shot. Many others were deported, while most of those who stayed were
left without work and ration cards, i.e. without the means of survival. Appeals for
help on their behalf fell on deaf ears and it was only in July 1940 that the head of the
Comintern, Georgii M. Dimitrov, wrote Georgii M. Malenkov, head of the Central
Committee’s cadre administration, asking that these people be helped and accepted
into the Belorussian and Ukrainian parties.14 This was done, but those who had
13. For the Politbiuro’s decision on the prisoners, Voroshilov’s order of September 1939, and
the Beriia resolution and Politbiuro approval of March 5, 1940, see: Katyƒ. Dokumenty
zbrodni, op. cit.: doc. nos. 9, 10, 217; Katyn. Plenniki..., op. cit.: same doc. nos. For lists of
names of executed prisoners from the three camps and names of prisoners who were spared,
see: J´drzej Tucholski, Mord w Katyniu (Warsaw, 1991). The volume includes some NKVD
documents (in Russian) published later in the Polish and Russian Katyn volumes. Polish
scholars cite the total number of Polish prisoners executed by the NKVD in spring 1940,
counting both those from the three camps and those in west Belorussian and west Ukrainian
prisons, as 21,857; these included military officers as well as civilians, mostly civil service
officials.
14.  For Beriia’s directive of September 15, 1939, see: Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti
SSSR..., op. cit., vol. I., doc. no. 33. For studies on the Soviet regime in eastern Poland, 1939-
1941 and deportations, based on Polish documentation, see: Norman Davies, Antony Polonsky,
eds, Jews in eastern Poland and the USSR, 1939-1946 (New York, 1991); Jan T. Gross,
Revolution from abroad. The Soviet conquest of Poland’s western Ukraine and western
Belorussia (Princeton, NJ, 1988); Keith Sword, ed., The Soviet takeover of the Polish eastern
provinces, 1939-1941 (New York, 1991); Id., Deportation and exile. Poles in the Soviet Union,
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been deported elsewhere still lacked work and ration cards, so that many died
before help was finally authorized for them. 
The Soviet measures cited above indicate that Stalin’s goal was to liquidate
Polish “bourgeois” cadres as well as many former Polish communists. Most of the
latter were suspect simply because of their membership in the condemned Polish
Communist Party. These measures did not, however, mean that Stalin had no
interest in any kind of future Poland. Indeed, while the above-mentioned Poles
were being arrested or liquidated, some Polish left-wing intellectuals and selected
communists were active under the leadership of the writer Wanda Wasilewska in
Lvov (Ukrainian: L’viv, Polish: Lwo@w, Russian: L’vov), west Ukraine, from the
autumn of 1939 to June 22, 1941. They published newspapers and worked on
Polish language textbooks for schools. In October 1940, a Soviet policy of
emphasizing Polish history and culture was noted by the Poles. It was accompanied
by decreasing pressure to ukrainize the city, also by rumors on the raising of a
“Polish Legion.” In November 1940, the left-wing group organized a much touted
celebration of the Polish national poet, Adam Mickiewicz (1798-1855), on the
occasion of the 85th anniversary of his death. He was presented as a poet of the
people. (Some Polish intellectuals remarked snidely that Mickiewicz was being
made over into a Bolshevik). All this indicates Stalin’s interest in nurturing this
particular group of Poles for future use.15
The rumors about a “Polish Legion” might have been spread by the Wasilewska
group and/or by Soviet authorities to encourage Polish officers to come out of
hiding — perhaps to fill a need. Indeed, Russian documents show that in October
15. See Bogdan Czaykowski, “Soviet policies in the literary sphere: Their effects and
implications,” and Mieczys∏aw Inglot, “The socio-political role of the Polish literary tradition
in the cultural life of Lvov: The example of Adam Mickiewicz’s work,” in Keith Sword, ed.,
The Soviet takeover ..., op. cit.: 102-148. For the sudden emphasis on Polish history and culture
in October 1940, accompanied by rumors of a “Polish Legion,” as well as snide remarks on
Mickiewicz being made over into a Bolshevik, see: Tadeusz Tomaszewski, Lwo@w. Pejsa§
psychologiczny (Warsaw, 1996): 27, 44. These are diary notes by a young Polish psychologist,
covering the period 1940-1945. Earlier rumors about the raising of “Red Polish Legions” in
former eastern Poland were reported by the British representative in Kaunas, Lithuania, in June
1940, and in July by Kazimierz Papée, Polish ambassador to the Vatican. They may have been
connected with a Soviet-inspired proposal made in London in late June to the head of the Polish
government-in-exile, general W∏adys∏aw Sikorski, that a Polish army could be raised in
former eastern Poland in return for Polish recognition of the Soviet western frontier as
established in late September 1939, see: Henryk Batowski, Polska dyplomacja na obczyênie,
1939-1941, 2nd rev. ed. (Krako@w, 1991): 301-302, also A. M. Cienciala, “The question of the
Polish-Soviet frontier...,” art. cit. 
1939-1948 (London, 1994) (cites a few Russian documents). For studies on deportations based
on Russian documents, see: V.S. Parsadanova, “Deportatsiia naseleniia iz zapadnoi Ukrainy i
zapadnoi Belorussii v 1939-1941 gg.,” Novaia i noveishaia istoriia, 2 (1989); Stanis∏aw
Ciesielski et al., eds, Masowe deportacje radzieckie w okresie II wojny Êwiatowej, 2nd ed.
(Wroclaw, 1994). On Polish communists in western Belorussia and western Ukraine, see N. S.
Lebedeva, “The Comintern and Poland...,” art. cit., and for Dimitrov’s letter to Malenkov of
July 30, 1940, see Nataliia S. Lebedeva, Mikhail M. Narinskii, eds, Komintern i vtoraia
mirovaia voina. Chast’ I. do 22 iuniia 1941 (Moscow, 1994) doc. no. 112: 399-400, 400-401
(note). In October 1939, Dimitrov himself had sent the NKVD two letters with lists of 500
persons suspected of “provocatory” actions in connection with the activity of the Ukrainian and
Belorussian communist parties, see ibid.: 137, note 1.
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1940 high NKVD officials interviewed Polish officers held in the Lubianka prison,
Moscow, with a view to forming a Polish unit in the Red Army. Ultimately, they
chose colonel Zygmunt Berling and a few others who had declared readiness to
serve. They were ordered to draw up plans for a Polish division in the Red Army.
Several months later, on June 4, 1941, the Politbiuro ratified a decision by the
National Commissariat of Defense, that this division be established by July 1,
1941.16 Several questions come to mind here: Why and when did Stalin order the
NKVD to select certain Polish officers to be spared for eventual future use? What
were the criteria in making such selections? When did Stalin give orders for
interviews to begin? What was to be the political significance of this Polish
division? Whatever the answers — and they may be connected with increasingly
tense German-Soviet relations — these documents indicate that Stalin was thinking
of a Polish unit in the Red Army, perhaps as military cadres for a future communist
Poland. Indeed, on June 22, 1941, the day on which Nazi Germany attacked the
USSR, a declaration by Berling and his companions — which Berling claimed was
dictated to them by the NKVD — spoke of a future, reborn Poland as part of the
USSR. However, a declaration made at the same time by a group of Polish
communists spoke of fighting against the Germans for “a free and independent
Poland.”17 Whatever this meant, it seems that they and their IKKI mentors were
better attuned to Polish sensibilities than Berling and the NKVD.
The plan to create a Polish division was shelved with the signing of the Sikorski-
Maiskii Pact in London on July 30, 1941. It should be noted that original Soviet
proposals for this agreement included a future “ethnic” Poland (i.e. minus former
eastern Poland) and the immediate establishment of a “Polish National Committee”
in the USSR which would raise a Polish armed force there. However, the Polish
government’s opposition and the need for British military help led Stalin to give up
these proposals, at least for the time being, while the Poles gave up their demand for
official Soviet recognition of the prewar (Riga) Polish-Soviet frontier. (This issue
was left in suspense, though each side proclaimed its version of what the agreement
signified on frontiers). The Sikorski-Maiskii Pact restored Polish-Soviet relations
and the two sides declared they would support each other in the war against
Germany. Furthermore, Polish prisoners were to be “amnestied” (a face saver for
the Soviet government) and a Polish army was to be raised in the USSR.18 The
questions that come to mind here are the following: What were Stalin’s thoughts
during these negotiations? What were his directives to the Soviet ambassador in
London, Ivan Maiskii? What kind of agreement did Stalin hope to reach with the
16. For Beriia’s note to Stalin of November 2, 1940 with information on groups of selected
Polish officers, see: W. Materski, ed., Z archiwo@w sowieckich. T. 1: Polscy jeƒcy wojenni w
ZSSR, 1939-1941 (Warsaw: ISPPAN, 1992): doc. 7. (p. 2 is missing because it was missing in
the Russian xerox copies handed to the Polish government in October 1992. The full text is
available in the Archives of the President of the Russian Federation, Moscow).
17. For these declarations, made on June 22, 1941, see: Dokumenty i materia∏y do historii
stosunko@w polsko-radzieckich (Warsaw, 1973) VII: docs 126, 132.
18. See A. M. Cienciala, “General Sikorski...”, art. cit.
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premier of the Polish government-in-exile and commander-in-chief of Polish
armed forces, general W∏adys∏aw Sikorski, when he visited the USSR in early
December 1941 to discuss with Stalin problems relevant to the Polish army and
visit the troops? Did Sikorski’s disinclination to discuss changes in the Polish-
Soviet frontier have any impact on Stalin’s decision to send the first leading cadre
of the Polish Workers’ Party (PPR) to Poland at the end of December 1941? (These
matters will be discussed at more length later in this paper).
As mentioned earlier, Stalin severed relations with the Polish government in
London in late April 1943. The pretext was that government’s request for an
inquiry by the International Red Cross into the massacre of Polish officers whose
graves were found by the Germans at Katyn, near Smolensk. It has been known for
some time, however, that this was no sudden decision for Stalin for he had told
Wanda Wasilewska at the end of January 1943 that he expected a break in relations
with the London Poles. Therefore, he told her, a new Polish organization was to be
established in the USSR, which he named the “Union of Polish Patriots.” He also
decided that the first issue of its newspaper, which he named Free Poland, was to
appear on March 1.19 At roughly the same time, in February, talks took place in
German-occupied Warsaw between the Polish underground leadership and the PPR
leadership, but no agreement was reached. The PPR wanted to discuss the
establishment of a postwar Polish government, which might include Sikorski; it
also demanded a seat in the High Command of the Home Army, the underground’s
military organization. The Home Army command rejected these demands.20 I
found no documents on the Stalin-Wasilewska and PPR-Home Army
conversations in the Russian archives. On the second matter, the following
questions arise: Was this a PPR initiative sanctioned by Moscow, or was it
undertaken independently from Moscow? Either way, what was Stalin’s thinking
on these talks?
As mentioned earlier, I had hoped to find documents which would help answer
all these questions. I was particularly interested in documenting Stalin’s changing
conceptions of postwar Poland, a topic I had studied previously through published
documents on the Polish Workers’ Party (PPR).21 In summer 1994, I spent eight
weeks in Moscow reading documents relevant to Soviet policy on Poland in World
19. On the Wasilewska-Stalin talks at the end of January 1943, see her memoirs,
“Wspomnienia Wandy Wasilewskiej (1939-1944),” Archiwum Ruchu Robotniczego,
(Warsaw, 1982) VII: 382. On the Union of Polish Patriots in the USSR, their ideology and
programs, see: Zbigniew KumoÊ, Zwiàzk Patrioto@w Polskich. Za∏o§enia programowo-
ideowe (Warsaw, 1983); for a selection of the Union’s press, see: Wac∏aw Poteraƒski and
Maria Wilusz, eds, Publicystyka Zwiàzku Patrioto@w Polskich, 1943-1944. Wybo@r (Warsaw,
1967). For a study of Wanda Wasilewska’s wartime activity, see: Eleonora Syzdek,
Dzia∏alnoÊç Wandy Wasilewskiej w latach drugiej wojny Êwiatowej (Warsaw, 1981). 
20. On the PPR-Underground Army Command talks in German-occupied Poland in early
1943, see: A. M. Cienciala, “The activities of Polish communists as a source for Stalin’s policy
towards Poland in the Second World War,” The International History Review, VII, 1 (1985):
129-145. (N.B. p. 133, note 14, erroneously cites Wasilewska’s reminiscences published in
Archiwum Ruchu Robotniczego as vol. III; it should be VII). 
21. See note 19 above.
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War II in three archives: (1) Rossiiskii Tsentr Khraneniia i Izucheniia Dokumentov
Noveishei Istorii (RTsKhIDNI, The Russian Center for Preservation and Study of
Documents of Contemporary History, formerly the Tsentral’nyi Partiinyi Arkhiv,
TsPA, Central Party Archives); (2) Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii
(AVP, The Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation); and (3) The Tsentr
Khraneniia Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii, (TsKhSD, The Center for Preservation of
Contemporary Documentation) which includes documents released from the
Archives of the President of the Russian Federation. Here I would like to note that
in applying for an IREX grant in October 1992 and writing for permission to work
in the first two archives listed above (I applied to the third when I was already in
Moscow), I lacked two important items of information: (1) that key documents
dealing with foreign policy and defense were located in Stalin’s “special files,”
which were then in the inaccessible Presidential Archive, Kremlin, though some
had been released on various occasions to other archives; (2) that the
declassification schedule for the AVP, indicating when some of its documents were
to be accessible, had a gap for the years 1927-1945. I had not seen any mention of
the first, and did not know about the second because, not being a student of the
“Cold War,” I did not receive the relevant bulletin before I left for Moscow.22 I did,
however, know that the RTsKhIDNI lacked certain materials of the former Central
Party Archives, e.g. materials from the Central Committee’s General Department,
as well as documents on CC plenums and Politbiuro protocols after 1940, while
those Politbiuro protocols for 1919-1940, that were accessible, had considerable
gaps, including foreign policy materials.23 Finally, I had heard that commission
reports and other materials on which Politbiuro decisions were based, were still
inaccessible.24 (I will discuss lacunae in the other two archives as I come to them).
Despite this depressing information, I hoped that at least some of these materials
might be declassified and available by the time I arrived in Moscow. Furthermore,
my letters to the archive directors specified my interest in Soviet wartime policy on
Poland, and in granting me permission to do research on this topic, they did not
indicate that most of the relevant documents were still inaccessible.
In the three archives listed above, I did not, of course, find the type of documents
located in British, American, and Polish government archives, i.e. Cabinet papers;
22. On Stalin’s special files, see Raymond L. Garthoff, “Some observations on using the Soviet
archives,” Diplomatic History , 2 (1997): 245. For a catalog of these special files for the years
1944-1953, see: V. A. Kozlov, S.V. Mironenko, eds, Arkhiv noveishei istorii Rossii. T. I:
“Osobaia papka” I. V. Stalina. Iz materialov Sekretariata NKVD-MVD SSSR 1944-1953 gg.
Katalog dokumentov (Moscow, 1994). According to the established declassification schedule
for the AVP, documents for 1917-1922 were to be declassified by 1993, and those for 1922-
1927 and 1945-1953 by September 1994, but the dates 1928-1945 were omitted, see: Vladimir
V. Sokolov, Sven S. Holtsmark, “Notes on the Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian
Federation,” Bulletin. Cold War International History Project. Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars (Washington, DC), 3 (Fall 1993): 26.
23. See: J. Arch Getty, V. P. Kozlov, eds, Kratkii putevoditel’. Fondy v kollektsii, sobrannye
Tsentral’nym Partiinym Arkhivom (Moscow, 1993): XII. This is now the RTsKhIDNI.
24. See: Michael David Fox, David Hoffmann, “The Politburo protocols, 1919-1940,” The
Russian Review (January 1996): 99-103.
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Prime Minister papers; instructions to ambassadors and their reports; written
opinions of high government officials and their discussions, either in letters or
marginal comments. (The latter are especially useful in British Foreign Office
documents). Nor did I find reminiscences and notes by key Soviet personalities,
such as those available on the Polish side from Wanda Wasilewska and Jakub
Berman.25 However, I did find much interesting and valuable material which cast
an indirect light on Stalin’s thinking and thus his policies regarding Poland.
In the RTsKhIDNI, I concentrated on reading papers relevant to Poland in the
Comintern Archives, i.e. in the Georgii M. Dimitrov and the Dimitrii Z.
Manuil’skii Secretariats. (G. M. Dimitrov was Secretary General of the Comintern
from 1935 to 1943, while D. Z. Manuil’skii seems to have been Stalin’s official
spokesman there). In reading these files, I found Nataliia S. Lebedeva’s article “The
Comintern and Poland” very helpful. The volume of documents she edited with M.
M. Narinskii on the Comintern and World War II appeared after I left Moscow, but
this excellent collection contains only one document dealing directly with Polish
communists in the USSR.26 It is known that after the “dissolution” of the Comintern
in May 1943,27 Dimitrov and Manuil’skii continued their work with Polish
communists, but did so in the “International Information Department” of the
Central Committee, subsequently renamed the “Foreign Policy Department.” I read
some of the files belonging to these two departments, which hold documents
mainly for 1944.28 The Comintern’s “Department of Special Communications,”
which handled couriers and radio stations was renamed the “Scientific Research
Institute no. 100.” The latter was closed to researchers, at least when I was there.
The justification was that it contained cypher communications which were still
classified. I was surprized to hear this, since at least some of them had been
published in Poland and the USSR many years ago, while a large collection of
cyphers is accessible in the AAN, Warsaw.29
In fond 495, opisi 74 (Dimitrov) and 10a (Manuil’skii), I found much interesting
material on Polish communists in 1939, 1940-1941 (to June 22, 1941), and then in
1944, but very little on the following: the Polish communists in the USSR in 1942-
1944; the Polish army in the USSR led by general W∏adys∏aw Anders in 1941-
1942 (there are some spy reports); and the Polish army in the USSR in 1943-1944,
led by general Zygmunt Berling. (He was promoted to general in spring 1943).
25. For Wasilewska’s memoirs, see note 18 above; for J. Berman’s papers, see: AAN, Warsaw,
Archiwum KC PZPR, “ SpuÊcizna Jakuba Bermana.” 
26. See Dimitrov’s letter to Malenkov of July 30, 1940 in N. S. Lebedeva, M. M. Narinskii, eds,
Komintern i vtoraia mirovaia voina..., op. cit.
27. See N. Lebedeva, M. Narinsky, “Dissolution of the Comintern in 1943,” International
Affairs , 8 (1994): 89-99.
28. Many of these documents were published in 1995, see SSSR-Pol’sha...., op. cit.
29. See Czes∏aw Madajczyk, ed., Korespondencja mi´dzy sekretarzami PPR a sekretarzem
generalnym Mi´dzynarodo@wki Komunistycznej (Warsaw, 1967). (The 37 radio telegrams in
this collection cover the period June 11, 1942-May 11, 1943). See also AAN, Warsaw:
“Archiwum lewicy polskiej,” collection: KC PZPR, A.190/ 1-13; A.248/12. 
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Some Russian documents on the Anders army were published in Poland, and more
documents on the two Polish armies may well be located in the NKVD/GRU
(Glavnoe Razvedyvatel’noe Upravlenie — Central Intelligence Admisnistration)
archives because copies of selected documents on the Polish army in 1941-1942
from the Presidential archive in the Kremlin — given to the Polish government in
October 1992 and published in Poland later that year — are NKVD documents.30
Furthermore, the Soviet liaison officer with both Polish army leaders was the
NKVD major, later general, Georgii S. Zhukov (not to be confused with marshal
Georgii K. Zhukov). This officer is frequently and favorably mentioned by Berling
in his memoirs.31 Nor did I find any material on the left-wing Polish group in L’viv,
1939-1941, even though Sofiia Dzerzhinskaia is known to have supervised their
activities and their newspaper, Nowe Widnokr´gi. Sofiia Dzerzhinskaia was the
widow of Polish communist leader Feliks Dzerzhinskii — F. Dzier§yƒski — the
first head of the Cheka. Moreover, it is known that Wanda Wasilewska, who
became a member of the Ukrainian Communist Party and a deputy to the Supreme
Soviet from L’viv, saw Stalin at least twice during this period of time, but I found
no Russian records of these conversations.
 The bulk of the material in the opisi I studied in fond 495 for 1940-1941 dealt
with individual Polish communists in the USSR. I did, however, find a most
interesting document which may cast some light on Stalin’s thinking about Poland
in spring 1941. This is a letter to G.M. Dimitrov of April 30, 1941, written by Sofiia
Dzerzhinskaia. Sofiia was a member of IKKI and as “political referent” for Poland
she reported to Dimitrov and Manuil’skii. In her letter, she reported on a meeting
and conversation which took place on April 15 between her, and her son Jan —
“senior referent” for Poland, and NKVD officer — on the one side, and some
Polish “comrades” on the other. These included Boles∏aw Mo∏ojec, formerly of
the “Paris initiative group,” and Marceli Nowotko, a second string activist who, like
many minor Polish communists, had survived Stalin’s purges because he was
imprisoned in Poland.32 The conversation concerned the establishment of a new
Polish communist party. In her letter, Sofiia was very critical of Mo∏ojec, whom
she accused of having a swelled head from his exploits in the Spanish Civil War, as
well as for his work on the Information Bulletin in 1939, which she condemned for
30. See: W. Materski, ed., Z archiwo@w sowieckich. Tom II: Armia polska w ZSSR 1941-1942
(Warsaw, 1992). As in all volumes of this series, the original Russian documents are printed in
facsimile with the Polish translation on the opposite page. See also: W∏adys∏aw Anders, An
army in exile; the story of the Polish Second Corps (London, 1949); reprint : Knoxville, TN,
1981 and K. Sword, ed., Deportation and exile, op. cit.
31. See: Zygmunt Berling, Wspomnienia. T. I: Z ∏agro@w do Andersa (Warsaw, 1990). These
interesting memoirs contain many innaccuracies, so they must be checked against the excellent
biography by Stanis∏aw Jaczyƒski, Berling. Mi´dzy s∏awà a pot´pieniem (Warsaw, 1993).
32. Marceli Nowotko became the first head of the new party in late 1941, but was assassinated
in mysterious circumstances in November 1942. Boles∏aw Mo∏ojec — head of the PPR
military arm — and his brother Zygmunt, who allegedly carried out the assassination at his
brother’s bidding, were executed on party orders. It is still not clear whether B. Mo∏ojec
actually ordered his brother to kill Nowotko, and if he did, whether he acted on his own
initiative, see K. Kersten, op. cit.: 11-12.
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spreading the “wrong ideas.” She also criticized him for seeing himself as the
leader of the future Polish communist party. She noted that Mo∏ojec rejected the
charge used by the Comintern to justify the dissolution of the Polish party in 1938,
i.e. that it had been infiltrated by the Polish police. He should, she wrote, carry out
“self-criticism” for his errors in the Information Bulletin (errors that she did not
spell out), also for the “unacceptable tone” of his letter to Dimitrov of April 2. (The
letter was not in the file, but it is clear that Mo∏ojec had demanded a meeting with
Dimitrov).
 Despite Mo∏ojec’s attitude, and despite the fact that the “comrades” defended
their participation in the defense of “bourgeois” Poland against the Germans in
September 1939, Sofiia read to them the Comintern resolution of May 16, 1939 that
the Polish party was to be reconstructed. This, she noted, made them very happy.
(The text of the resolution is missing from the file.) She suggested to Dimitrov that
these comrades needed Polish instructors in the party school they were attending.33
She added that they should study materials “unmasking” the true history of the old
Polish party. Finally, she noted that they should be aided to work out a party
platform “at the given time.”34
In fact, Dzerzhinskaia herself drew up a draft program for the new party, which
she sent to Dimitrov in the form of a memorandum, dated April 18. This was an
uninspired grab bag of communist political, economic, and social slogans. The
suggested “platform” included standard socialist demands, but declared that the
immediate task was “the struggle for national liberation of the Polish people from
the yoke of German imperialism.” The Polish Socialists (Polish acronym PPS) and
Peasant Party (Polish acronym SL) — who were already resisting the Germans in
occupied Poland — were labelled “agencies of Anglo-American capitalism.” The
new party was to lead national resistance — but also unmask “the anti-national and
anti-Soviet character of the so-called Sikorski government and the so-called Polish
Legion.” (There was no such legion, but there were Polish armed forces in Great
Britain; the Polish Highland brigade, originally in French Syria, which moved to
Egypt to fight on the British side; and the underground movement in Poland, which
recognized the Polish government in London — A.C.) After overthrowing
imperialism, the party would establish “the worker-peasant power of the
proletariat.” There followed a list of the standard political, social and economic
reforms to be carried out — many of which were long part of the PPS and SL
programs — but the key task was the establishment of “a national liberation front”
33. Polish sources indicate that Polish communists began to attend this school in the early fall
of 1940. The Polish group consisted of: Pawel Finder, Czes∏aw Skoniecki, Marceli Nowotko,
Jakub Aleksandrowicz, Roman Âliwa, Anastazy Kowalczyk, Jan Turlejski, Lucjan Partyƒski,
Pinkus Kartin, Augustyn Mical, Feliks Papliƒski and Boles∏aw Mo∏ojec, see: M.
Malinowski, op. cit.: 345. This was a one-year party school, as proposed on behalf of IKKI in
Dimitrov’s letter to A. A. Andreev of August 31, 1940. It was located first at Nagorno, but later
moved to Pushkino. See: N. S. Lebedeva, M. N. Narinskii, eds, Komintern i vtoraia mirovaia
voina..., op. cit., I, doc. no. 118: 424-425, 426 (note). 
34. S. Dzerzhinskaia, letter of April 30, 1941, to G. M.Dimitrov, RTsKhIDNI, f. 495, op. 12, d.
105, ll. 16-22.
RESEARCHING SOVIET WORLD WAR II POLICY ON POLAND IN RUSSIAN ARCHIVES 265
against the Germans. Therefore, Dzerzhinskaia proposed the following: that a
provisional party center be set up; that contacts be established with communists in
Poland; that a party organ (newspaper) be established to explain Comintern
decisions and direct the work of communists in Poland; also that [political] work be
carried out among Polish emigrants in the USA, Canada, Latin America, and
France.35
Polish communist sources indicate that the party “platform” (program) was
discussed by the students at the party school and hammered out under Dimitrov’s
guidance sometime in the fall of 1941 — but there is only a faint trace of this in the
files of the Dimitrov Secretariat. Furthermore, it is not clear whether this platform
was finalized before the crash, at take-off in Vyazma, of the airplane carrying the
first cadres to Poland in September 1941.36 It can be assumed that Dzerzhinskaia’s
April talk with the Polish comrades was sanctioned by Stalin. However, the
“platform,” as finalized in the fall of 1941, omitted attacks on the prewar Polish
Communist Party, the socialist and peasant parties, and the Sikorski government.
Clearly, Stalin’s policy was modified to some extent by the conclusion of the
Sikorski-Maiskii pact of July 30, 1941 and the Sikorski-Stalin talks in Moscow on
December 3-4, 1941, but he still took care to have his Polish communists
transported to Warsaw, and later to other localities in German-occupied Poland.
The initial PPR cadre group, carrying a microfilm of the progam and two radio
stations, was parachuted from a Soviet plane onto the outskirts of Warsaw at the
end of December 1941. Their activities indicate that their goal was to attract
support from the socialist and peasant parties so as to split the underground
movement and then take over the leadership, but they never gained any significant
support.
As I worked in the RTsKhIDNI, I also looked for documents on Stalin’s Polish
policies in the Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation, AVP, dividing
my time between the two archives. In summer 1994, the AVP had no catalog, only a
list of Foreign Ministers’ and Deputy Foreign Ministers’ Secretariats, as well as
“Referenturas” for various countries. I was particularly interested in the
negotiations for the Sikorski-Maiskii pact, the Sikorski-Stalin and the Stalin-Eden
talks in Moscow in December 1941. I had hoped to find Russian documents
throwing light on Stalin’s thinking on the latter, for which Polish and British
records have been available for a long time.37 However, I did not find anything on
the Sikorski-Maiskii Pact, and nothing to illustrate Stalin’s thinking on Sikorski’s
visit to Moscow in early December. The Russian records of some Russian-Polish
35. S. Dzerzhinskaia, memorandum to Dimitrov, April 18, 1941, ibid., ll. 4-11.
36.  For a summary of the drafting process, based on Jakub Berman’s account, see: M.
Malinowski, op. cit.: ch. 10. For a full account, see: AAN, Warsaw, Jakub Berman collection,
245/2, pp. 8 ff. For the final text as published see: Polska Partia Robotnicza. Dokumenty
programowe 1942-1944 (Warsaw, 1984) doc. no. 1: 51-55 and note 1: 55.
37. For Sikorski’s account of his talk with Stalin as told to the British Ambassador in the USSR,
see: Sir Stafford Cripps to Anthony Eden, December 6, 1941, in: A. Polonsky, ed., The Great
Powers..., op. cit., doc. 30: 95-98 (also other documents cited there).
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diplomatic conversations preceding the Sikorski-Stalin conversation of December
3, 1941, as well as a record of that particular conversation were published in Russia
in 1990, then in English translation in 1991. (It is worth noting that in that
conversation, which concerned the Polish army in the USSR, when Sikorski asked
about the missing Polish officers, Stalin replied that all Polish prisoners of war had
been released, but suggested that some of them might have left on their own for
Manchuria — then under Japanese occupation! This may be an example of Stalin’s
“black” humor.)38 Still, I hoped to find another copy of the Russian record in case it
had marginal notes or comments. Indeed, I found a listing for the Sikorski-Stalin
conversation of December 3, 1941 in one of the files of the Molotov Secretariat.
Alongside this listing, however, there was a note in red ink stating the record had
been transferred to the archives of the Central Committee. The note is dated March
7, 1953, i.e. just after Stalin’s death.39 When I asked about this document at the
AVP, I was advised to inquire if it was at the RTsKhIDNI. There I was told to try
the Archives of the President of the Russian Federation in the TsKhSD. On
inquiring there, I was told they did not have it, so it was presumably in the
Presidential Archives housed in the Kremlin — which were virtually inaccessible. 
I did, however, obtain access in the AVP to Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Ia.
Vyshinskii’s Secretariat, which proved to be of interest for 1941. This contains his
letter to Molotov reporting on Sikorski’s tour of Polish military units in December,
after his visit to Moscow. At one point, both men were in a room at general Anders’
headquarters, which had a large wall map of the USSR and its western borderlands.
Sikorski looked at it for a while and said the two nations should be friends. He also
said Stalin had told him that they would not quarrel over territory, and that Lvov
(L’viv/Lwo@w) was a Polish city. Stalin, continued Sikorski, thought the Poles
would have problems with the Ukrainians, but promised to help.40 I ordered a xerox
copy of this letter, but was told on leaving that it was not ready, so I could empower
a friend to pick it up later. However, when this friend tried to do so, she was told the
document belonged to a category that could not be xeroxed — so I was very glad
that I had made extensive notes of my own. This Vyshinskii letter complements one
of the Russian documents on the Eden-Stalin talks edited by Oleg Rzheshevskii,
first published in Russia in spring 1994. One of the draft Soviet protocols to the
treaty — which does not seem to have been presented to Eden — stated that Poland
38. See N. Lebedeva, ed., “Stalin, Sikorskii, Anders i drugie,” Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn’, 12
(1990); the text of the Stalin-Sikorski conversation (pp.134-140) is taken from AVP, f. 048, op.
52a, p. 258, d. 2; for the same in English translation, see: “Stalin, Sikorski, Anders et al.,”
International Affairs, 1 (1991): 126-132.
39. See AVP, Molotov Secretariat, op. 3, p. 243, Table of contents, no. 19: “T. Stalin. Zapis’
besedy tov. Stalina s Sikorskim, 3.XII.41.” 
40. A. Ia. Vyshinskii, letter to Molotov on his travels with gen. Sikorski visiting Polish army
units, December 10-15, 1941, AVP, Vyshinskii Secretariat, op. 2, p. 30, d. 10, p. 10, l. 104 (4).
Sikorski’s statement to Vyshinskii is confirmed by the general’s statement to A. Eden in
January 1943, that Stalin told him: “Lwo@w should again become part of Poland” and that
Poland should annex East Prussia, see A. Polonsky, The Great Powers..., op. cit., no. 30: 97,
note. 4. 
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was to be restored within her 1939 frontiers. However, this statement was
immediately contradicted by the qualification that the west Ukrainian and west
Belorussian territories would revert to the USSR, except for regions with
predominantly Polish populations. This could be done either by leaving Lvov
(L’viv, Lwo@w) to Poland, and transferring Belostok (Bia∏ystok) and Vilna
(Vil’nius/Wilno) to the USSR, or vice versa, transfering Vilna and Belostok to
Poland while leaving Lvov to the USSR. The document clearly indicates that Stalin
recognized these cities as predominantly Polish. Furthermore, Polish territory was
to be enlarged by annexing the western part of East Prussia.41 (In his conversations
with Eden, Stalin went even further, speaking of a Polish western frontier on the
Oder river.)42 Thus, when Stalin tempted Sikorski with L’viv — probably in a
private conversation at the banquet on December 4 — he saw it as one of the
alternatives cited in the draft protocol to the Anglo-Soviet treaty. However, until
the relevant Russian documents are accessible, we will not know for certain
whether this is what Stalin intended to propose to Sikorski when the general
returned to Moscow for another visit. (Sikorski was to return to Moscow after his
tour of Polish army units, but fell ill with the flu and, true or not, this was the reason
given for cancelling his projected second visit to the Soviet capital.)
The third place I worked in were the Archives of the President of the Russian
Federation in the Tsentr Khraneniia Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii. As mentioned
earlier, I had gone there originally in quest of the Stalin-Sikorski conversation of
December 3, 1941, but was told this document was not there. However, the
assistant director, a pleasant and efficient young woman, brought me a catalog of
documents concerning Poland. This contained items on the deportations of Poles
from former eastern Poland, with detailed instructions on how people were to be
taken from their homes at dead of night to railway stations, loaded into cattle cars,
where they were to go, etc. There were also documents on Katyn and the cover-up. I
recognized many of the documents as published in Poland, and ordered xerox
copies of those I had not seen before. In particular, I was intrigued by an instruction
of July 3, 1940 sent by Stalin to an official named Grushko in the Lvov (L’viv)
Obkom, with a copy to Nikita S. Khrushchev and another official named
Burmistenko at the Central Committee, KP(b) Kiev. Stalin instructed the Lvov
Obkom to stop job discrimination against Polish workmen, who had to claim they
were Ukrainians in order to find work. Therefore, he ordered the Lvov Obkom to
call a meeting of “the better sort of Polish people,” hear their grievances, and then
work out measures to improve relations with the Poles.43 I suspect that Wanda
41. See: Oleg Rzheshevskii, ed., “Vizit Edena v Moskvu v dekabre 1941 g. Peregovory s I. V.
Stalinym i V. M. Molotovym,” Novaia i noveishaia istoriia, 2 (1994): 85-102; Id.: War and
diplomacy. The making of the grand alliance. Documents from Stalin’s archives (Amsterdam,
1996) doc. no. 5, point 10, p. 23. 
42. For a summary of the British version of the Eden-Stalin talks in Moscow, December 1941,
see: S. M. Miner, Between Churchill ..., op. cit.: 186-193; the complete British text of the talks
is in The Public Record Office, London, WP(42)8.
43. Stalin’s telegram of July 3, 1940 to Lvov Obkom, TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 48, d. 6, l. 1.
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Wasilewska may have drawn Stalin’s attention to this problem. Whether she did or
not, the instruction may indicate Stalin’s interest in securing the loyalty of Polish
workers in L’viv — which the draft Soviet protocol to the Anglo-Soviet treaty
mentioned above recognized as a preponderantly Polish city. Thus, Stalin’s
instruction of July 3, 1940, may tie in with his support of Polish communist and
left-wing intellectuals there, and may also be another indication that at this time he
envisaged leaving the city in a postwar Poland controlled by Moscow.
Furthermore, if Sikorski had agreed to frontier changes, he might have been
welcome as the head of a Polish puppet government, for as mentioned earlier, in
their talks with the Home Army leaders in February 1943, the PPR leaders
proposed including him in a postwar Polish government. Indeed, there are
indications that Sikorski envisaged ceding most of former eastern Poland to the
USSR,44 but he could hardly have agreed to do so during the war without losing the
support of the vast majority of Poles who perceived territorial cessions to the Soviet
Union as the beginning of renewed Russian domination.
In conclusion, even though I did not find the type of documents that I was
seeking, my stay in Moscow was well worthwhile. I found at least some documents
that supplement the published sources on Stalin’s actions towards Poland and thus
throw more light on his policies. Also, I would like to say that I found the staff at all
three archives to be most professional and helpful — and this despite their difficult
material situation. However, it is clear that significant research on Soviet wartime
foreign policy regarding Poland, and Soviet World War II policy in general, will
become feasible only with the declassification of hitherto classified foreign policy
documents for the period 1939-1945, and better still, 1933-1945, for this includes
Soviet policy in the prewar years. The old series of Dokumenty vneshnei politiki
SSSR, published from 1957 to 1977, omitted 1939 — a decision made by V. M.
Molotov. They consisted of carefully selected documents with ideological
commentaries in the end notes. There has been a breakthrough with the publication
of documents on 1939 in 1992, and on 1940-1941. However, large gaps still
remain, particularly on the timing and internal justification of Stalin’s decision to
side with Hitler, as well as on the working out of the secret protocol to the pact of
August 23, 1939.45 Other declassifications of war and postwar documents have
been rather selective and sometimes inspired by political motives. For example, the
Katyn documents held in sealed packets in the Presidential Archives, Kremlin,
were declassified to support charges of criminal activity against the CPSU (b).
Copies were given to President Wa∏´sa of Poland in October 1992, probably as a
gesture of Russian good will to strengthen that country’s links with Russia. The
44. On Sikorski’s thoughts about ceding most of former eastern Poland to the USSR, as noted
by his chief of Military Intelligence, colonel Leon Mitkiewicz, in January and March 1942, see:
S. Meiklejohn Terry, Poland’s place in Europe..., op. cit. : 128-130.
45. Dokumenty vneshnei politiki, XXII (1-2): 1939 god. (Moscow, 1992) and Dokumenty
vneshnei politiki, XXIII (1; 2-1,2): 1940-1941 (Moscow, 1995; 1998). For a critical review of the
documents for 1939, see: V. P. Safronov, Otechestvennaia istoriia, 3 (May-June 1995): 207- 210.
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same sets of criteria seem to apply to the gift of documents on the origins of the
Korean war to the South Korean government in summer 1994 (Stalin’s 1950
conversations with Kim Il Sung). Finally, though some Russian historians have,
since 1989, obtained access to many hitherto classified documents and could
publish them, Stalin’s wartime thinking and goals are still the subject of
controversy for lack of authoritative documentation. 
British and U.S. documents provide many insights into the thinking and goals of
Winston S. Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt on Poland with relation to the
USSR, as well as their views and aims regarding the latter, Germany, Japan, and
other states at different periods of the war. But today, as we near the sixtieth
anniversary of the outbreak of World War II, historians wishing to use Russian
archival sources in order to reconstruct Iosif V. Stalin’s prewar, then wartime
thinking and goals regarding Poland, the western powers, and other states — must
do so mainly by extrapolation from actions recorded in documents written by
Soviet officials, supplemented by his speeches and the Soviet press. The
declassification of Central Committee and Politbiuro documents on foreign policy,
as well as NKVD documents and more AVP materials for the years 1939-1945, is
necessary to obtain a full picture of Stalin’s thinking, and thus of Soviet foreign
policy during this period. Let us hope that they will be declassified soon so that
historians can stop guessing and proceed to fill a yawning gap in twentieth-century
history.
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